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Comments
WAIVER OF OBJECTION BY TRIAL CONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION
Ordinarily, the initiative in excluding improper evidence by
means of an objection is left to the opposing counsel.' If counsel,
for one reason or another, fails to make a timely objection to im-
proper evidence, he is said to have "waived" his right to appeal on
the admission of such evidence. "A rule of Evidence not invoked is
waived."2 But there are other ways by which an objection may be
waived. The purpose of this article is to consider what trial conduct
constitutes an implied waiver of a valid objection.3
Broadly speaking, an objection may be impliedly waived by
trial conduct in one of two ways; either by prior trial conduct or by
subsequent trial conduct.4 This article will illustrate and discuss
these two classifications of waivers, and analyze the criteria used
by appellate courts in holding a valid objection waived by conduct
at the trial level.
Before beginning an analysis of this question, a few observa-
tions must be noted. Even though the rules of evidence as to
waivers apply to all types of inadmissible evidence,, it is extremely
difficult to formulate any general rule in this area because, in many
instances, the cases fail to supply all the facts as to when and how
the objection was raised.6 Even if such facts are given, the courts
merely state that the objection has been waived without satisfactor-
ily discussing why it was deemed to have been waived.7
1 McComIcK, EVIDENCE § 55 at 130 (1954). 'But such failure by the party
does not of itself preclude the trial judge from excluding the evidence
on his own motion if the witness is disqualified for want of capacity or
the evidence is incompetent, and he considers that the interests ofjustice require the exclusion of the testimony."
2 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 18 at 321 (3d ed. 1940).
3 For a general discussion of the "objection" see 1 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE
§ 18 (3d ed. 1940).
4
"Such waiver or estoppel may arise from failure to object, from acts
done or omitted before the evidence is offered ... or from some affirma-
tive act done after the ruling on the evidence." In re Estate of Kaiser,
150 Neb. 295, 308, 34 N.W.2d 366, 374 (1948).
5Note, 35 MICH. L. REV. 636, 640 (1937).
6 See, e.g., Hoagland & Co. v. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 131 Neb.
112, 267 N.W. 242 (1936).
7 See, e.g., People v. Dye, 81 Cal. App. 2d 952, 185 P.2d 624 (3d Dist. 1947);
Edgerton v. Johnson, 217 N.C. 314, 7 S.E.2d 535 (1940).
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Further, in any analysis of this problem it is imperative to
determine what kind of fact the inadmissible evidence seeks to
establish. The cases ordinarily do not talk in terms of "primary,"
"mediate," and "ultimate" facts,8 but speak only of the "fact"
sought to be established. For example, in a negligence case, one
party uses opinion evidence to establish the "primary" fact that
the defendant was going sixty miles per hour, and from this he
wants to establish the "mediate" fact that defendant was speeding.
From this "mediate" fact he asks the jury to infer the "ultimate"
fact that the defendant was negligent. In applying the waiver
doctrine the courts will discuss the waiver in terms of the "fact"
which was sought to be established. They fail to discuss which
"fact." It will become evident that this failure to distinguish be-
tween primary, mediate, and ultimate facts explains, to some
degree, the confusion in this area as to the exact limitations on per-
missible trial conduct. With these problems in mind let us consider
the two basic classifications of waivers by trial conduct.
II. PRIOR WAIVER
A. PRIOR FAILURE TO OBJECT
As was previously stated, a failure to object will constitute a
waiver as to the evidence being introduced. Assume, however,
attorney A introduces inadmissible evidence and opposing counsel,
B, fails to object. As to this evidence B has clearly waived any
objection. Later, A introduces similar inadmissible evidence on the
same primary fact in question. May B now object, or has he, by his
prior silence, waived any objection? Has he, in other words, im-
pliedly waived his objecti6n in advance?
Often, courts reason that since the evidence was already ad-
mitted without objection it cannot be prejudicial to B's case, and B
cannot subsequently object to similar evidence on the same fact.9
The effect of such holdings is to place the trial lawyer on the "horns
of a dilemma." As a practical matter, and in the interest of trial
expediency, the more experienced advocate refrains from objecting
8 An ultimate fact is one upon whose combined occurrence the law raises
the duty, or the right in question. A primary fact, for the purposes of
this article, is one from whose existence may be rationally inferred
the existence of an ultimate fact. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d
927 (2d Cir. 1944).
9 Boston Woven-hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E.
657 (1901); Shrimpton & Sons v. Philbrick, 53 Minn. 366, 55 N.W. 551(1893); Shelton v. Southern Ry., 193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232 (1927).
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unless the evidence is damaging to his case.10 However, if he fails
to object, believing that the evidence, in and of itself, is not damag-
ing, he runs the risk of having similar inadmissible evidence ad-
mitted which may have a cumulative adverse effect on his case.
To avoid such an implied waiver he must object to all tech-
nically inadmissible evidence introduced by his adversary. This
certainly is not in the best interests of trial expediency. Further,
counsel's repeated objections to technically inadmissible evidence
which at the time is not damaging to his case, has a profound ad-
verse effect on the jury1 as well as the judge. The judge may
become annoyed with such repeated objections, and the jury may
feel counsel is trying to hide some relevant fact.
The better view would permit B to object even though previous
inadmissible evidence had been admitted without objection.12 This
view takes into consideration the fact that repeated objections are
annoying and do have an adverse effect upon the jury. It also
recognizes that while the initial inadmissible evidence may not be
damaging, repeated use of and elaboration on the same evidence
will prove harmful to the opponent's case.13 This view clearly
reconciles the interests of trial expediency with adequate protection
of the objector's interests when he feels the cumulative effect of
repeated admissions of inadmissible evidence will damage his case.14
It also eliminates the problem of any adverse effect on the jury in
that the objector does not have to make repeated objections to
technically inadmissible evidence.
10 See Ladd, Common Mistakes in the Technique of Trial, 22 IOWA L. REV.
609 (1937); Armstrong, Objections to Evidence in Jury Trials: A Mul-
tiple Review, 23 TENN. L. REV. 943 (1955).
11 See Ladd, Objections, Motions and Foundation Testimony, 43 CORNELL
L. Q. 543 (1958); Armstrong, Objections to Evidence in Jury Trials: A
Multiple Review, 23 TENN. L. REV. 943 (1955). For an excellent discussion
of the practical use of objections, see KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS
ch. 4 (1954).
12 Bobereski v. Insurance Co., 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 Atl. 412 (1932).
13 "[Tihe fact that incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence may
be introduced on a trial by one party, without objection from the other
party, because he may deem it of no importance and harmless, does
not prevent the latter from objecting to the further introduction and
elaboration of such evidence when he is of opinion that it is both
important and harmful. The principle of estoppel does not apply in
such case." Id. at 595, 161 Atl. at 415.
14 "[F]ailure to object to illegal evidence at one time, does not waive a
right to object to like evidence offered later. If these objections had
been sustained, the force of the former testimony would probably have
been weakened in the minds of the jury." Lowery v. Jones, 219 Ala.
201, 202, 121 So. 704, 706 (1929).
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(1) The Nebraska position
While there are no cases in Nebraska specifically covering this
problem, there is dicta to the effect that Nebraska follows the
waiver doctrine. In In re Estate of Kaiser,15 proponent of a con-
tested will was permitted, without objection, to identify the two
children who were beneficiaries under the will. However, when
she was asked to "call the children forward so the jury may see
them"'0 the contestant purported to object saying: "We object to
this as incompetent and immaterial and improper conduct. I am
glad to have the jury see them, but I think I should preserve the
right .... 17 The court felt there was consent to this subsequent
evidence rather than objection. The court's later statement that
"such waiver or estoppel may arise.., from acts done or omitted
before the evidence is offered, as by failure to object to previous
similar evidence,"' 8 is mere dictum because, in this case, there was
no valid objection to be waived.
Headnote four of Hickman v. Layne 9 states that "error cannot
be predicated on the admission of certain testimony, where ample
testimony of the same nature was admitted without objection. '20
As a result, Hickman has been cited 21 for the proposition that prior
failure to object to inadmissible evidence constitutes a waiver in
advance of any subsequent valid objection to similar evidence on
the same matter. The headnote, however, is much broader than the
actual holding of the case. In Hickman, the court admitted hearsay
testimony of two witnesses as to the purported dissolution of the
partnership in question. The court held that this was not error
because the objector had "himself testified that he was cognizant
of the report . . . that Layne & Krone [the partnership] had dis-
solved.' 1 2 Thus, Hickman is actually a case where the objector
admits the very fact, evidence of which he seeks to have excluded.
The court properly held that there was a waiver, but not because
he had previously failed to object to evidence admitted by his
adversary.
15 150 Neb. 295, 34 N.W.2d 366 (1948).
16 Id. at 307, 34 N.W.2d at 374.
17 Ibid.
18 150 Neb. 295, 308, 34 N.W.2d 366, 374 (1948).
19 47 Neb. 177, 66 N.W. 298 (1896).
2o Id. at 178, 66 N.W. at 298.
21 Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1926).
22 47 Neb. 177, 183, 66 N.W. 298, 299 (1896).
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Thus, while there is dicta in the Nebraska cases indicating that
Nebraska follows the waiver theory, no case may be found which
specifically substantiates this proposition.
B. FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE
(1) Where adversary objects
Frequently, prior implied waiver arises when A, who initially
introduces inadmissible evidence over B's objection, attempts sub-
sequently to object when his adversary, B, introduces similar in-
admissible evidence in rebuttal on the same matter. Is B entitled
to "fight fire with fire?" Has A waived any subsequent objection
by initially introducing inadmissible evidence?
Most courts hold that where allegedly inadmissible evidence is
introduced over objection, the opposing counsel may introduce
similar evidence on the same matter.2 3 These courts place emphasis
upon the original party's voluntary action in offering the evidence.24
A is the guilty party in that he first introduced the inadmissible
evidence. He induced the court to set a rule of evidence for the
trial and should not object if his adversary relies on the same rule
of evidence to introduce similar evidence to rebut or deny.
(2) Adversary fails to object
Suppose, however, that B fails to object when A initially intro-
duced the inadmissible evidence. Should this, in any way, affect B's
right to "fight fire with fire" and enable A to object even though he
initially introduced the inadmissible evidence?
Some courts25 take the rigid position that regardless of whether
B objects or not, A is still the culpable party in that he initially
introduced the inadmissible evidence and should, therefore, be pre-
cluded from objecting if B acts accordingly. This position has some
merit logically in that it bases the question of A's waiver on A's
actions rather than on some action of his adversary. Here again
the emphasis is placed on the original party's voluntary action in
offering the evidence..
20 See, e.g., Albertson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 242 finn. 50, 64
N.W.2d 175 (1954).
24 1 WIGMORE, EVmEcN § 15 at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
25 See cases collected 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENc E § 15 at 306, n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
See also McNab v. Jeppesen, 258 Minn. 15, 102 N.W.2d 709 (1960);
Krider v. Hempftling, 137 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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Other courts20 take the position that if A's inadmissible evidence
is admitted without objection, B is not authorized by way of rebut-
tal to put in inadmissible evidence over timely objection by A. The
courts adopting this view place greater emphasis on the fact that
B did not object initially, and therefore cannot maintain that A's
initial introduction was a wrong which estops A from now object-
ing.27 Thus, these cases purport to talk of A's prior waiver, but are
actually predicating the prior waiver as to A on some action or inac-
tion of his adversary, B. The argument that there can be no equaliza-
tion of errors28 or that "neither can complain of a ruling either ad-
mitted or rejected-a waiver being predicable to both,"2 9 assumes
that it is "error" for B to fail to object. It further assumes that B's
initial failure to object waives any objection he may subsequently
have. But as was previously stated, B may decide not to object
initially because of the possible adverse effect it may have on the
judge and jury. Further, it is in the interest of trial expediency
for B to withhold objection unless the original evidence is clearly
damaging to his case. However, under this rule, B must continually
object to all technically inadmissible evidence if he hopes to rebut
or deny it.
A much more flexible principle is the so-called Massachusetts
rule30 which gives the trial court the discretionary right to deter-
mine if B should be permitted to introduce similar inadmissible
evidence in rebuttal. Under this rule it is immaterial whether B
initially objects to A's evidence or not. The emphasis is placed,
not upon B's objection or failure to object, but upon the effect of
A's initial inadmissible evidence. If the original evidence is imma-
terial and not prejudicial to B's case, the court will say no waiver
attaches to A, and B may not rebut with similar evidence. This is
in the interest of trial expediency and, as long as the initial evidence
is not prejudicial to B's case, sound judicial practice. On the other
hand, if A's original evidence is prejudicial to B's case, the court
will say A has waived in advance any objection to similar evidence
subsequently introduced by B in rebuttal. Thus, under this rule,
the prior waiver doctrine, as to A, is used merely as a means to
20See cases collected 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 15 at 304 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
See also Laursen v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 813,
268 P.2d 104 (2d Dist. 1954); Keene v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 308,
210 S.W.2d 926 (1948).
27 1 WiGMom, EVIDENCE § 15 at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
28 Stapleton v. Monroe, 111 Ga. 848, 36 S.E. 428 (1900).
29 1 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 15 at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
30 Note, 35 MicH. L. REV. 636 (1937).
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an end. If B, however, goes beyond mere "rebuttal," the reason for
attaching a prior waiver to A disappears because, while A could
foresee a possible attack for rebuttal purposes, he could not foresee
an attack which ranges beyond mere rebuttal and directly attacks
the ultimate fact. The important question then becomes: What
"facts" may B rebut, and what is meant by "rebuttal"?
For the sake of discussion, suppose A attempts to establish a
primary fact by opinion testimony.31 From this primary fact A
wants the jury to infer an ultimate fact. B, his opponent, fails to
object.32 Under the Massachusetts rule, this failure to object does
not preclude B from introducing similar inadmissible evidence for
rebuttal purposes. What fact may B rebut, and how may he do it?
Various possibilities are available to B and, unfortunately, the cases
fail to provide adequate answers because they fail to go beyond
merely stating that B can rebut the same "fact" in question.
Conceivably, B could attack the truthfulness of the primary
fact by introducing similar inadmissible evidence on the same fact,
hoping to discredit the primary fact in the eyes of the jury. Thus,
if A, in an automobile negligence case, introduced opinion testimony
that B was going sixty miles per hour, it seems fair to permit B to
introduce similar evidence that he was only going forty miles per
hour. Here B is attacking the primary fact introduced by A's in-
admissible evidence.
On the other hand, B may decide to indirectly attack the ulti-
mate fact by showing that the inference drawn from the primary
fact is untrue. If the evidence used by B to attack the inference
is admissible, clearly there is no question as to his right to do so.
Likewise, if B uses similar inadmissible evidence to attack the in-
ference, this should still be within his right to rebut. In State v. Wit-
ham,33 the birth of a child to an unmarried woman was admitted
without objection as evidence to infer adultery on the part of the
defendant. The defendant accepted the primary fact but attacked
the inference drawn from it by producing counter-evidence of other
men's intercourse with the woman. Thus, while an attack was made
upon the ultimate fact by inadmissible evidence in rebuttal, it was
only a collateral attack. The rebuttal was directed towards the
inference drawn from the primary fact. The court allowed this
rebuttal saying "[I]f one side introduces evidence irrelevant to the
31 Other types of inadmissible evidence could be substituted at this point.
Opinion testimony is used merely as an example.
32 The situation where B objects but is overruled will be discussed infra.
33 72 Me. 531 (1881).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 4
issue, which is prejudicial and harmful to the other party, then,
although it come in without objection, the other party is entitled
to introduce evidence which will directly and strictly contradict
it.,, 41
Since the cases fail to distinguish between primary and ulti-
mate facts, it is extremely difficult to define the exact limitations
of the rebuttal. It is submitted that inadmissible evidence should
be limited to denying or attacking the primary fact, or to attacking
the inferences drawn from the primary facts. Since B's case is
prejudiced solely because of A's original evidence as to the primary
fact and the inferences whcih may be drawn from it, B's rebuttal
should be limited to those aspects of the initial inadmissible evi-
dence. In any event, rebuttal should not be extended to permit B
to use inadmissible evidence to attack directly the ultimate fact.
To permit B to introduce all sorts of inadmissible evidence to attack
directly the ultimate fact would "open the door" too far.35
(3) The Nebraska position
Nebraska apparently takes the position that if one party ini-
tially introduces inadmissible evidence, he waives any objection
to subsequent inadmissible evidence introduced by his adversary.
In Serratore v. Miller,8 6 defendant had inadvertently made it known
on his voir dire examination and opening statement to the jury that
he was covered by insurance. Subsequently, the plaintiff, by testi-
mony on two occasions, made it clear that the defendant was cov-
ered by liability insurance. The court admitted that the manner
in which this was done was "highly improper,"37 but felt defendant
had waived any objection by initially introducing the same subject
matter.38 Nebraska apparently takes the view, under this case, that
if one party admits the fact as true, it makes no difference if the
opposing party subsequently introduces it in a "highly improper"
manner. Further, no consideration of the prejudicial effect of such
fact is apparently made. In Serratore the initial introduction of the
fact of insurance coverage was in no way prejudicial to the plain-
tiff's case. In fact it was prejudicial to the defendant's case! The
34 Id. at 536.
35 See McComIcK, EVIDENCE § 57 at 133 (1954).
36 130 Neb. 908, 267 N.W. 159 (1936).
37 Id. at 912, 267 N.W. at 161.
38 "A defendant may not predicate error on plaintiff's introduction of
evidence as to a fact irrelevant to any issue in the case, where such
fact has been first brought to the attention of the jury by defendant."
130 Neb. 908, 912, 267 N.W. 159, 161 (1936).
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plaintiff subsequently re-introduced the same evidence and used
it for his own case with no pretense of using it for rebuttal purposes.
But the court held firmly to the doctrine that the party initially
introducing the evidence waives any subsequent introduction of
similar evidence by the opposing party.
Nebraska fails to define the exact limitations of rebuttal of
inadmissible evidence by the party who fails to object. The Ser-
ratore case indicates that he may have a broad latitude of permis-
sible action. If the court permits him to use the inadmissible evi-
dence for his own purposes when it initially is not, to any degree,
prejudicial, it is difficult to predict what the court would allow
him to do for rebuttal purposes.
III. SUBSEQUENT WAIVER
A. THE GENEmu RuLE AND iTs EXCEPTION
Frequently, the question of subsequent waiver arises when
one party, who previously objected to inadmissible evidence, sub-
sequently introduces similar inadmissible evidence on the same
fact. The general rule is: The previous error of admission is cured
by the opponent's subsequent use of evidence similar to that which
had previously been challenged.39 In other words, the objecting
party waives his previous valid objection by subsequently introduc-
ing similar admissible evidence. The reasoning behind such a rule
is simply that if the opponent duly objected and was erroneously
overruled, this objection would theoretically save him on appeal,
and he does not have to resort to presenting similar inadmissible
evidence.40 If he chooses to present similar inadmissible evidence,
he has waived his right to resort to appeal on that particular issue.
Few courts, however, are willing to apply strictly this general
rule, feeling that it is unfair, in effect, to preclude the objector
from fighting his case at the trial level. Further, the theoretical
solution that the objection will save the objector on appeal, in
many cases, is unsatisfactory as a practical matter. It forces the
objector to the added expense of an appeal without any assurance,
where appeal is not a matter of right, that his case will even be
heard. Consequently, an exception is made to the general waiver
rule. No waiver of his previous objection results if he subsequently
introduces responsive evidence merely to offset or explain, so far
39 1 WIGMOPE, EVIDENCE § 18(D) at 344 (3d ed. 1940). See also United States
v. Gruber, 123 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941); Franklin v. United States, 193
Fed. 334 (3d Cir. 1912).
40 1 WiGMOm, EvmiENcE § 15 at 304 (3d ed. 1940).
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as is possible, the erroneously admitted evidence.41 In Hoel v. City
of Los Angeles,42 defendant subsequently introduced the remainder
of a police report, portions of which had been admitted earlier
over his objection. The court held this did not constitute a waiver
and said: 43
If the appellant makes his objection to what he deems . . . inad-
missible evidence ... and is unsuccessful, it is hardly safe for him
to stand firm, risking everything on the objection. Usually he will
proceed, despite the error, to meet the opposing case on the merits.
This necessary precaution on his part does not indicate acquies-
cence in the ruling and does not result in a waiver of the error.
Generally, therefore, the courts hold no waiver results from acts
which are "defensive or precautionary. 4 4 However, the cases cited
in support of this exception again fail to define the limits of these
"defensive or precautionary" measures.
(1) Limitations on rebuttal
The difficulty encountered in analyzing the general rule and
its exception again comes when we attempt to determine what
constitutes "rebuttal," and what "facts" the objector may attack.
Suppose that A introduces inadmissible evidence to prove a primary
fact from which the jury is to infer the ultimate fact. B objects
but is overruled. Under the exception to the general rule B may
subsequently introduce similar evidence solely for "rebuttal" pur-
poses. Again it becomes extremely important to determine the
limitations of his rebuttal privilege because if B exceeds these
limits, he is deemed to have waived his previous objection.
Some cases attempt to define the limits of rebuttal by saying
that a waiver attaches when the subsequent evidence is "offered
... not in defense as to the improper testimony, but is offered in
defense against the original charge."45 This is nothing more than
saying the objector can attack the primary fact but may not di-
rectly attack the ultimate fact.
Clearly, he can directly deny the truthfulness of the primary
fact by similar inadmissible evidence. However, if he decides to
41 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENC E § 18(D) at 344 (3d ed. 1940). See also Salt Lake
City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 457 (8th Cir. 1900); Chicago City Ry. v. Uhter,
212 Ill. 174, 72 N.E. 195 (1904); State v. Beckner, 194 Mo. App. 281, 91
S.W. 892 (1906).
42 136 Cal. App. 2d 295, 288 P.2d 989 (2d Dist. 1955).
43 Id. at 311, 288 P.2d at 998.
44 Ibid.
45 State v. Pattison, 135 Wash. 392, 397, 241 Pac. 966, 967 (1925).
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attack the ultimate fact by adopting the primary fact, there are.
two possible alternatives. In one case he adopts the primary fact
for purposes of his own; in the other he adopts it merely for the
purpose of drawing a different inference from it.
Suppose B, even though he objected to the manner in which
the primary fact was proven by A, adopts it for his own purposes.
If he does this, the primary fact itself should not be considered
objectionable, and further, B should be held to have waived the
objection to the manner in which it was proven. Thus, in Dell-
Wood Tires, Inc. v. Riss & Co.,46 defendant objected to the admission
of plaintiff's ledger sheet and invoice on the ground that they were
not properly identified. The court held that the objection was
waived when both the ledger sheet and the invoices were freely
used by defendant in making its defense. Likewise, in Miles v.
State,4 7 where the accused objected to the state's use of portions
of a witness' deposition against him, the court felt he had waived
his objection because he subsequently used the same portions of
the deposition to connect up his defense. Thus, actual use of the
objectionable evidence for one's own purpose goes beyond mere
rebuttal and results in a waiver of the previous objection. 48 If a
waiver results from subsequent use of the same evidence, a waiver
of the objectionable manner by which a primary fact is proven
should also result if the objector subsequently adopts the same
primary fact for his own purposes.
However, this is not the case where B intends to adopt the
primary fact solely for the purpose of drawing a different inference
from that primary fact. When B's original objection is overruled,
he is forced into a rather weak argument - namely, he must argue
that a different inference may be drawn from the primary fact.
His position is especially hazardous if the primary fact is highly
prejudicial. In United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmilter,49 the
defendant was on trial for felony murder and objected when the
prosecution introduced defendant's prior prison record. He was
overruled and the prior prison record was established. Subse-
quently, defendant attempted to show the jury that because he
had a prison record, he wouldn't want to get involved in a felony.
This reasoning was used to substantiate defendant's alibi. The
court held that the initial primary fact was so prejudicial that it
46 198 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. App. 1946).
47 268 P.2d 290 (Okla. Crim. 1954).
48 See also People v. Workman, 131 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1954).
4) 310 F;2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962).
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denied the defendant due process of law, and that his subsequent
adoption of that fact did not constitute a waiver. The dissent took
the position that the defendant had subsequently used the primary
fact for his own purposes, and therefore had waived any previous
objection. It is submitted that the majority position is correct
because defendant did not voluntarily use the primary fact for
his own purposes. When his initial objection was overruled, he was
forced to either deny the primary fact, which in this case was im-
possible, or he could adopt the primary fact, not for his own
purposes, but to convince the jury that another inference should
be drawn from the fact that he had a prison record.
Thus, a waiver will result if the objectionable evidence or
primary fact established by such evidence is subsequently adopted
by the objector for his own purposes. Although the cases do not
talk in these terms, a waiver will not, or should not, result if the
objector is forced to adopt the primary fact because his objection
has been overruled, and forced to argue that a different inference
should be drawn from such primary fact. It may be a different case
if he fails to object and voluntarily adopts the primary fact, hoping
to convince the jury that a different inference should be drawn.
In that case, he is voluntarily running the risk that the jury will
accept his version of the inference to be drawn, and he should not
then be able to complain on appeal if the jury disagrees with his
inference.
(2) The Nebraska position
In In re Cheney's Estate,50 witnesses were permitted, over objec-
tion, to testify that the deceased, in their opinion, was of sound
mind when he executed the will in question. Later, the objector
introduced other witnesses and asked them similar questions con-
cerning the deceased's mental soundness at time of execution. The
Nebraska Supreme Court held there was no waiver by the sub-
sequent introduction of similar evidence for rebuttal purposes.
The court said: 51
It is true the general rule is that error in the admission of evidence
is waived where the party aggrieved thereby subsequently intro-
duces the same evidence.... But a different rule obtains where a
party, after objecting to evidence, and excepting to the ruling
thereof, introduces similar evidence, as in this case, solely for the
50 78 Neb. 274, 110 N.W. 731 (1907).
51 Id. at 277, 110 N.W. at 732. See also Macke v. Wagener, 106 Neb. 282, 288,
183 N.W. 360, 362 (1921) (objector held to be able to offer evidence of
a similar character to rebut inferences which might be drawn from
adversary's evidence without waiving the objection).
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purpose of meeting his adversary's case, rebutting or combatting
the evidence to which he excepted, but without any intention of
abandoning his exceptions.
However, in Sump v. Omaha Public Power Dist.,52 plaintiff in-
troduced, over objection, inadmissible evidence as to the value of the
land to be condemned, and defendant countered with similar evi-
dence. The Nebraska Supreme Court completely disregarded the
exception to the general rule and stated that "a party may not
successfully complain of the introduction of evidence of a like
character to that which it subsequently introduced."' ' Why the
defendant was not permitted to rebut plaintiff's evidence as to
value with similar evidence, under the exception to the general
rule, is not discussed. The Sump case, clearly a subsequent waiver
case, cites Allen v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins Co., 4 as authority
for its holding. Allen, also a subsequent waiver case, held that
"a party may not successfully complain of the introduction of
evidence of a like character to that which it has introduced.) 55
However, as authority for its holding the court cites Serratore v.
Miller,56 clearly a prior waiver case. The ultimate effect of this
error is to eliminate, at least as far as Allen and Sump are con-
cerned, the exception to the general rule. Consequently, under
Sump and the more recent cases 57 Nebraska's position appears to
be that a subsequent introduction of inadmissible evidence is a
waiver of prior valid objections. Why these recent cases do not
speak of the exception is unclear. Perhaps, through inadvertence,
the earlier Cheney case has not been cited to the court. Neverthe-
less, the Cheney case has never been overruled, and the doctrine
which it enunciates is clearly in line with the majority of other
jurisdictions -namely, that if inadmissible evidence is introduced
over objection, the objector has the right to attack the inference
drawn from that evidence without waiving his objection. Further,
the statutes provide that "when a detached act, declaration, con-
versation or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration
or writing which is necessary to make it fully understood, or to
explain the same, may also be given in evidence. 58 Consequently,
52 168 Neb. 120, 95 N.W.2d 209 (1959).
53 Id. at 126, 95 N.W.2d at 214.
54 149 Neb. 233, 30 N.W.2d 885 (1948).
55 Id. at 240, 30 N.W.2d at 888.
56 130 Neb. 908, 267 N.W. 159 (1936).
57 See Tyrrell v. State, 173 Neb. 859, 115 N.W.2d 459 (1962); Hoagland
& Co. v. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 131 Neb. 112, 267 N.W. 242 (1936)(facts unclear as to whether it is a prior or subsequent waiver cause).
5 8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1215 (Reissue 1956).
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under the Nebraska statutes and the Cheney case, the objector has
the right to introduce similar inadmissible evidence to rebut or
explain the initially introduced inadmissible evidence.
(3) Cross Examinations
Deserving special attention is the corollary problem of subse-
quent waiver by cross-examination. After inadmissible testimony
has been admitted over objection, the objector, in most jurisdictions,
may rebut with similar inadmissible evidence. Cross-examination
is merely one means of rebuttal. Suppose A's witness gives inad-
missible testimony over B's objection. B cross-examines hoping to
break the force of the testimony, but elicits the same testimony.
Has B waived his previous valid objection by subsequently elicit-
ing the same evidence on cross-examination?
Some courts merely apply the general rule that an objection
is waived where the same or similar evidence is subsequently
elicited by the objector.50 These courts apparently refuse to permit
the objector the right to rebut altogether. Other courts permit
cross-examination without waiver if the objector "reserves his
objection"60 before cross-examining. This seems a rather needless
and overly technical requirement.
The more reasoned cases say that if the cross-examination is
used to rebut or to break the effect of the previously admitted
testimony, it does not constitute a waiver even if the same testi-
mony is elicited. This is a more suitable solution to the waiver
problem in the cross-examination situation. Ordinarily, the same
testimony will be repeated on cross-examination 6' and, if the objec-
tor is to be permitted the right to rebut the original testimony, he
must be free to cross-examine without fear of waiving his prior
valid objection if he is unfortunate enough to elicit the same infor-
mation. To hold that a waiver may result any time the same in-
formation is elicited on cross-examination would greatly impair
59 Powell v. Weld, 410 Ill. 198, 101 N.E.2d 581 (1951).
60 State v. Puckett, 237 S.C. 369, 117 S.E.2d 369 (1960).
61 "It would indeed be a strange doctrine, and a rule utterly destructive of
the right and all the benefits of cross-examination, to hold a litigant to
have waived his objection to improper testimony because, by further
inquiry, he sought on cross-examination to break the force or demon-
strate the untruthfulness of the evidence given in chief, in the event,
as would most usually occur, that the witness should on cross-examina-
tion repeat or restate some or all of his evidence given on his direct
examination." Levin v. Hilliard, 266 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Mo. App. 1954).
See also Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Dabney, 128 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
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the usefulness of cross-examination and make attorneys hesitant
to cross-examine the witness for fear of waiving the previous valid
objection.
(a) The Nebraska position
Consistent with the recent cases which fail to give the objector
the right to rebut with similar inadmissible evidence, Nebraska
holds that if the same or similar evidence is subsequently intro-
duced by the objector, he waives his objection. No allowance is
made for the fact that the similar evidence was elicited by cross-
examination. In Johnson v. Airport Authority,62 testimony as to
the value of condemned land was given over objection. Subse-
quently, the objector on cross-examination elicited evidence on the
same subject. The court held this to be a waiver of his previous
valid objection.63 No mention is made of Cheney, the Nebraska
statutes, or the exception to the general rule. Consequently, de-
spite Cheney, it appears that Nebraska, unfortunately, refuses to
recognize the exception to the general rule even in the area of
cross-examination.
Under the Johnson case, if a party attempts to cross-examine
after a valid objection, he runs the risk of waiving the objection
if he fortuitously elicits the same information on cross-examina-
tion. The practical effect of the Nebraska position under Johnson
is to seriously hamper the effective use of the cross-examination,
and if the objector cannot rely on Cheney and the right to rebut,
he must rely solely on his objection to "save him on appeal." As was
mentioned earlier, this theoretical salvation alone is inadequate.
B. SuBsEQuENT FAURE TO OBJECT
As previously stated, failure to object at the time the inad-
missible evidence is offered will result in a waiver of any objection
the party may have had. Suppose, however, that after first object-
ing to inadmissible evidence, the objector is silent when similar
evidence on the same primary fact is later introduced. Has he,
by his subsequent failure to object, waived his previous objection?
62173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426 (1962).
OS "Assuming that error was involved, it was waived by the appellant.
After the testimony was given, the appellant adduced evidence on the
subject. This evidence of the appellant, it is true, was elicited by cross-
examination, but the rule is the same whether it was elicited either on
direct or cross-examination. The rule is: 'Ordinarily a party may not
successfully complain of the introduction of evidence of a like character
to that which it subsequently introduced.' " (Emphasis added.) Id. at
812, 115 N.W.2d at 433.
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If the initial objection is overruled, it is clear that the judge
is going to allow subsequent similar evidence on this same primary
fact. To force repeated objections to the same type of evidence on
the same primary fact merely impedes the progress of the trial, to
say nothing of the adverse effect it has on the jury. The cases
generally say that if the objector is initially overruled, the objecting
party need not object every time similar inadmissible evidence is
subsequently introduced to establish the same primary fact.6 The
initial objection, if overruled, is treated as a continuing objection
to all subsequent similar evidence on the same primary fact. How-
ever, if the initial objection is sustained, the objector must repeat
the objection if his adversary subsequently attempts to introduce
similar evidence on the same primary fact. Failure to repeat the
objection will not waive the objector's right to appeal on the ad-
missibility of the subsequently introduced evidence under the rule
of evidence - a rule not invoked is waived.
(1) The Nebraska position
A Nebraska statute provides: 6 5
Where an objection has once been made to the admission of testi-
mony and overruled by the court it shall be unnecessary to repeat
the same objection to further testimony of the same nature by the
same witness in order to save the error, if any, in the ruling of the
court whereby such testimony was received.
This statute has been construed by the Nebraska Supreme Court
in Triplett v. Western Public Service Co.,6 to mean it is not neces-
sary to repeat the objection to further testimony of the same nature
by the same witness in order to save the error on appeal. This
statute has also been cited for the much broader proposition that
objections to the repetition of any testimony on which the court
has once ruled need not be repeated. 7 While this position is in line
with the majority of cases in other jurisdictions, it is not warranted
by the wording of the statute. Further, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has refused to go beyond the statute and allow one objection,
if overruled, to stand for all subsequent evidence on the same
64State v. Monninger, 182 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. 1962); Gardner's Adm'r v.
Dale, 309 Ky. 869, 219 S.W.2d 40 (1949); State v. Taylor, 130 W. Va. 74,
42 S.E.2d 549 (1947). Contra, Everett v. Sanderson, 238 N.C. 564, 78
S.E.2d 408 (1953).
65 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1141 (Reissue 1956).
66 129 Neb. 799, 263 N.W. 229 (1935).
6 7 FISHER, COURTS OF LIMrTD JURISDICTION § 429 at 792 (1950).
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primary fact. In Rakes v. State,68 the court stated that the statute
"has no application to further testimony of the same nature by
other witnesses to which no objection has been made."6 9 The court
reasoned that since subsequent evidence by other witnesses was
admitted without objection, the initial admission "could not have
been prejudicially erroneous." 70 Therefore, the initial objection
was waived by failure to object to subsequent testimony on the
same primary fact.
Thus, in Nebraska, the objection, if overruled, need not be re-
peated as to the same witness, but apparently must be repeated if
the same type of evidence is elucidated by another witness. If this
means that repeated objections must be made to the same manner
of proof on other primary facts, the Nebraska position seems de-
fensible. Merely objecting, for example, to hearsay evidence offered
to establish one primary fact should not permit the objector to
relax and assume that this objection will carry over to all other
hearsay evidence on other primary facts. It is submitted that it
is not the manner of proof that is important, but rather the primary
fact sought to be established. If the primary fact is inadmissible,
and is admitted erroneously over proper objection, the objection
should not have to be repeated when other evidence is subsequently
introduced to establish the same primary fact. The judge, by his
initial ruling, has made it clear that he will admit evidence on that
particular fact. To force repeated objections would impede trial
progress and generate an unfavorable impression on the jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
In both prior and subsequent waiver cases, difficulties arise
in attempting to define the permissible limits of rebuttal. The cases
do not clearly prescribe any such limits and, as a result, the trial
lawyer, who must act on the spur of the moment, may inadvertently
transgress these nebulous boundaries and waive a valid objection.
It is difficult to lay down any specific rules because the cases,
while purporting to give the right to rebut, fail to enlighten the
bar on what may be rebutted. This explains to a large degree the
confusing language found in some of the decisions,71 and permits
68 158 Neb. 55, 62 N.W.2d 273 (1954).
69 Id. at 64, 62 N.W.2d at 279.
70 Ibid.
71 See, e.g., Vermaas v. Fagan, 167 Neb. 465, 469, 93 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1958).
'Declarations against interest cannot be annulled or explained away by
counter declarations."
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the courts to use whatever textbook rule will allow them to affirm
the holding of the lower court.7 2 It is submitted, although the cases
fail to make the distinction or talk in these terms, that the rule
should be that similar inadmissible evidence should be allowed to
deny or explain the initially established primary fact,73 or to attack
the inference that may be drawn from that primary fact, but should
not be allowed to directly attack the ultimate fact in question.
William D. Kuester '64
72 1 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE § 15 at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
73 But see Vermaas v. Fagan, 167 Neb. 465, 93 N.W.2d 381 (1958). Plain-
tiff's witnesses gave testimony as to deceased's statements to the effect
that plaintiff would get deceased's land when he died. The court held
that this testimony could not be rebutted by defendant's witness' testi-
mony that deceased had made other statements indicating that he didn't
know what to do with his property.
